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Abstract​: The objection of horrible commands claims that divine command metaethics is                       
doomed to failure because it is committed to the extremely counterintuitive assumption that                         
torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be morally obligatory if God commanded these                           
acts. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that formulating this objection                     
in terms of counterpossibles is particularly forceful because it cannot be simply evaded by                           
insisting on God’s necessary perfect moral goodness. I show that divine command metaethics                         
can be defended even against this counterpossible version of the objection of horrible                         
commands because we can explain the truth-value intuitions about the disputed                     
counterpossibles as the result of conversational implicatures. Furthermore, I show that this                       
pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics has several advantages over Pruss’s                     
reductio counterargument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible                     
commands. 
 
Introduction 
 
Suppose God’s commands determine moral obligations. This is (roughly) the position of                       
so-called ‘divine command metaethics’. Often, it has been objected that divine command                       
metaethics is committed to the claim that torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be                             
morally obligatory if God commanded these acts. However, this commitment conflicts with the                         
widespread intuition that these acts are horrible and, thus, cannot be morally obligatory under                           
any circumstances. Therefore, we have a good reason to reject divine command metaethics. This                           
is (roughly) the so-called ‘objection of horrible commands’. Often, the proponents of divine                         
command metaethics argue that this objection is untenable because God is perfectly morally                         
good as a matter of metaphysical necessity and, therefore, cannot command horrible acts.                         
However, recent critics of divine command metaethics like Morriston, Wielenberg, and                     
Sinnott-Armstrong have objected that this manoeuvre is of no avail because the objection of                           
horrible commands can be reformulated in terms of counterfactuals with metaphysically                     
impossible antecedents, so-called ‘counterpossibles’. They claim that divine command                 
metaethics entails a number of counterpossibles that are false​. Therefore, we may infer by modus                             
tollens that divine command metaethics must be false as well. In this paper, I will argue for a                                   
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new way to defend divine command metaethics against this ‘improved’ counterpossible version                       
of the objection of horrible commands: I believe that we can explain our truth-value intuitions                             
about the counterpossibles that allegedly cause trouble for divine command metaethics as the                         
result of ​conversational implicatures​. If we explain our truth-value intuitions in this pragmatic way,                           
we can maintain the ​semantic assumption that the disputed counterpossibles actually bear the                         
truth-value ‘true’. We will see that this suffices to refute the counterpossible version of the                             
objection of horrible commands. Furthermore, I will argue that my proposal has several                         
advantages over Pruss’s (2009) popular reductio argument against the counterpossible version of                       
the objection of horrible commands. 
 
This paper has the following structure: First, I will illuminate the concept of divine command                             
metaethics. Second, I will depict the objection of horrible commands against divine command                         
metaethics. Third, I will show how perfect being theology can (allegedly) be cashed out to                             
disarm this objection. Fourth, I will point out how the objection of horrible commands can be                               
reformulated in terms of counterpossibles. Fifth, I will shed light on Pruss’s reductio argument                           
against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands and point out two                           
weaknesses of Pruss’s argument. Sixth, I will present a new way to defend divine command                             
metaethics that does not suffer from these weaknesses: namely, I will put forward a new                             
pragmatics-based debunking argument that allows to accommodate the truth-value intuitions                   
that (allegedly) cause trouble for divine command metaethics. Seventh, I will defend my                         
solution against an anticipated objection. I will conclude that even the counterpossible version                         
of the objection of horrible commands against divine command metaethics is​ ​unsuccessful. 
 
Definition of divine command metaethics 
 
In this section, I will illuminate what divine command metaethics is. In the course of this paper,                                 
I will refine this definition. For a start, I will define divine command metaethics in the following                                 
way: 
 
DCM: 
a) It is metaphysically necessary that, for every act x​, x is morally obligatory if and only                                 
if God commands ​x​.  
b) It is metaphysically necessary that, for every act ​x​, if ​x is morally obligatory, then ​x is                                   
morally obligatory​ because​ God commanded ​x​. 
 
I would like to clarify three aspects of this definition: First, please note that part (a) merely                                 
claims that the property of being morally obligatory and the property of being commanded by                             
God are co-instantiated across possible worlds. Part (b) goes beyond such a merely modal                           
characterisation by claiming that divine commands provide a suitable explanation for moral                       
obligations. Second, I take it for granted that divine command metaethics is formulated in terms                             
of moral obligations and not in terms of any other normative statuses (e.g. moral goodness or                               
wrongness). Presumably, this is not utterly important for the discussion of the objection of                           
horrible commands because one could easily reformulate the objection in terms of other                         
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normative statuses. Third, I recognise that it might not be entirely lucid how the ‘because’                             
relation used in part (b) of my definition is supposed to be understood. However, I would like                                 1
to point out that this is not important for the purpose of understanding the objection of horrible                                 
commands either. In the next section, we will see that part (a) of my definition is already                                 
sufficient to get the objection of horrible commands off the ground. 
 
Simple version of the objection of horrible commands 
 
In this section, I will depict what Adams calls the “gravest objection” (Adams (1987), 98) against                               
DCM, viz. the so-called ‘objection of horrible commands’. 
 
The objection is based on the intuition that there are acts that are ​not morally obligatory as a                                   
matter of metaphysical necessity. To illustrate this point, I will henceforth use Morriston’s                         
example of “the gruesome and painful sacrifice of randomly selected ten-year-old children”                       
(Morriston (2009), 250). Presumably, it is metaphysically necessary that this act is ​not morally                           
obligatory. Following Davis and Franks (2015, 2), I will call this act a ‘sacrificial scenario’. If the                                 
reader does not share my intuition that this act cannot be morally obligatory under any                             
circumstances, then he or she is free to exchange this example for something that he or she finds                                   
even more appalling.  2
 
I believe that the objection of horrible commands is best construed as a reductio argument with                               
three premises. To understand the first premise, remember that we chose the example of a                             
sacrificial scenario such that we may take the following premise for granted: 
 
(1) It is metaphysically necessary that a sacrificial scenario is not morally obligatory 
(premise). 
 
Second, virtually every theist believes that God is omnipotent. Furthermore, an omnipotent                       3
being has the power to command a sacrificial scenario. For this reason, we may take the                               
following premise for granted: 
 
(2) It is metaphysically possible that God commands a sacrificial scenario (premise). 
1 For an elaborate account of the ‘because’ relation that is at stake here, see Schnieder (2011). 
2 I would like to highlight two aspects about this assumption: a) First, not everyone might agree that there are 
acts that are​ not​ morally obligatory as a matter of metaphysical necessity. For instance, proponents of sceptical 
theism (e.g. Wykstra (1984), Bergmann (2001)) might argue that God could have a good reason for ​every 
command that, however, goes beyond our ken. Accordingly, the proponents of sceptical theism might be 
drawn to the position that there is literally no act that is ​not​ morally obligatory as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity. Indeed, this would be a quite easy way for the proponent of DCM to make the objection of horrible 
commands a non-starter. In this paper, however, I take it for granted that commanding a sacrificial scenario is 
not morally obligatory as a matter of metaphysical necessity. b) Second, please note that the example of a 
sacrificial scenario is deliberately chosen such that it is a lot more cruel than, say, the binding of Isaac (Genesis 
22) that many theists in the Judeo-Christian tradition do not take to be in conflict with God’s perfect moral 
goodness (e.g. Worsley (2018)). 
3 Pike (1969) and Geach (1973) are rare dissenting voices. 
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Third, let us assume the truth of DCM for ​reductio​. Remember that, according to the first                               
component of DCM, morally obligatory acts and acts that have been commanded by God are                             
co-extensional as a matter of metaphysical necessity. Therefore, the following counterfactual                     
proposition follows: 
 
(3) If God were to command a sacrificial scenario, then a sacrificial scenario would be 
morally obligatory (from (a) of DCM).  4
 
Fourth, the following proposition follows from (2) and (3):  5
 
(4) It is metaphysically possible that a sacrificial scenario is morally obligatory (from (2) 
and (3)). 
 
This is a problem. There is an obvious contradiction between (4) and (1). According to (4), it is                                   
metaphysically ​possible that a sacrificial scenario is morally obligatory. According to (1), this is                           
metaphysically ​impossible​. However, both cannot be true. Therefore, unless we are willing to                         
give up premise (1) or (2), we may draw the following conclusion: 
 
(5) DCM is false (by​ reductio​ from (1) and (4)).  
 
This is what the objection of horrible commands was supposed to show. 
 
Let me anticipate one important objection. Often, it is claimed that premise (1) is not as innocent                                 
as it seems. Thus, one might be inclined to try to defend DCM by giving up premise (1).                                   
However, denying (1) commits one to the position that it is metaphysically possible for a                             
sacrificial scenario to be morally obligatory. Ockham is usually considered as the most famous                           
proponent of this defence of DCM. However, I doubt that this manoeuvre is particularly                           
attractive because it runs into conflict with the widely shared assumption “that there is no                             
metaphysically possible world where the basic norms are different” (Enoch 2011, 146). Adams                         
(1987, 99-100) points out that especially Jewish and Christian believers tend to emphasise the                           
importance of this assumption. Therefore, the Ockhamist attempt to evade the objection of                         6
horrible commands by dropping premise (1) is of no avail. The objection of horrible commands                             
against DCM remains in full force. 
4 This step of the argument is not entirely uncontroversial. Davis and Franks (2015) have argued that a sensible 
proponent of DCM “finds herself attracted to theistic activism, in which case she will have at her disposal 
principled reasons for rejecting [(3)]” (Davis / Franks (2015), 17). However, I will not devote more attention to 
their argument because I believe that Morriston (2015) has convincingly shown that the way in which Davis 
and Franks suggest to make use of theistic activism creates more problems than it solves. 
5 This inference is warranted by the uncontroversial inference rule ‘(A > B) → (◇A → ◇B)’ (in which ‘>’ stands 
for the counterfactual ‘would’ conditional). For instance, Williamson (2007, 156) and Berto et al. (2018, 697) both 
explicitly endorse this principle. 
6 This premise is even the very foundation for many versions of the moral argument for God’s existence (cf. 
Adams (1987), 144-163). 
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Perfect being theology as a defence of divine command metaethics 
 
In this section, I will illuminate how DCM can be defended against the objection of horrible                               
commands by insisting that it is metaphysically necessary for God to be perfectly morally good.                             
This claim follows from the assumptions of perfect being theology that have a long history in                               
Western philosophy of religion (cf. Leftow (1989)). The backbone of this proposal is the                           
following claim: 
 
NECESSARY GOODNESS: It is metaphysically necessary that God is perfectly morally 
good.  7
 
There is a de re and de dicto reading of NECESSARY GOODNESS. If we understand it in terms of                                     
de dicto metaphysical necessity, it merely claims that being perfectly morally good is a                           
precondition for bearing the title ‘God’. On this understanding, the proposition ‘God is perfectly                           
morally good’ is true in every possible world. However, on this understanding, nothing                         
prevents the entity that bears the title ‘God’ from ceasing to be perfectly morally good and, thus,                                 
losing the title. If we understand NECESSARY GOODNESS in terms of ​de re metaphysical                           
necessity, it claims that the entity that bears the title ‘God’ is perfectly morally good in every                                 
possible world. Hence, on this understanding, the entity that bears the title ‘God’ cannot cease                             
to be perfectly morally good. I will take for granted the latter ​de re reading of NECESSARY                                 
GOODNESS. At this point, let me introduce another term: I will use the term ‘DCM*’ for the                                 
conjunction of DCM and NECESSARY GOODNESS. 
 
Let me explain why the objection of horrible commands does not threaten to refute DCM*. We                               
saw that the objection relies on premise (2) which claims that it is metaphysically possible for                               
God to command a sacrificial scenario. Now, to command a sacrificial scenario is without a                             
doubt a gross moral imperfection. However, according to NECESSARY GOODNESS, God is                       
perfectly morally good as a matter of metaphysical necessity. If God is necessarily perfectly                           
morally good, God necessarily refrains from commanding a sacrificial scenario because this                       
would be a moral shortcoming. For this reason, a proponent of DCM* can no longer sustain                               
premise (2). Therefore, a proponent of DCM* is no longer committed to (4). Thus, the                             
contradiction between (1) and (4) no longer arises. For this reason, DCM* is not vulnerable to                               
the objection of horrible commands. 
 
Of course, one might argue that this cure is not better than the disease because NECESSARY                               
GOODNESS is at odds with other assumptions that theists tend to hold dear. For instance, there                               
7 Please note that endorsing NECESSARY GOODNESS does not commit one to deny​ all​ forms of metaphysical 
contingency with respect to God’s commands. As long as we can ensure that God refrains from commanding 
anything as extreme as a sacrificial scenario, metaphysical contingency with respect to His commands does not 
obviously run into conflict with perfect being theology. On the contrary, to allow for a certain metaphysical 
contingency might even have several theological advantages. For instance, Leftow (2017) has argued that it 
helps to make sense of God’s ​love​ for His creation. 
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has been significant debate whether NECESSARY GOODNESS is compatible with a) God’s                       
omnipotence (Morriston (2001), Mawson (2002), Funkhouser (2006), Carey (2017)), b) God’s                     
perfect freedom (Rowe (2004), Bergmann / Cover (2006), Timpe (2017)), and c) God’s                         
praiseworthiness (Maitzen (2004)). If any of these worries turned out to be justified, then even                             
the simple version of the objection of horrible commands that I just depicted might successfully                             
refute DCM after all. However, to discuss all these objections against NECESSARY GOODNESS                         
exhaustively would exceed the scope of this paper. 
 
Counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands 
 
In this section, I will depict an improved version of the objection of horrible commands that                               
threatens to refute even the conjunction of DCM and NECESSARY GOODNESS (which I called                           
DCM*). Recently, Morriston (2009, 2015), Wielenberg (2005), and Sinnott-Armstrong (2009) have                     
argued that NECESSARY GOODNESS fails to disarm the objection of horrible commands                       
because this objection can be reformulated in terms of counterfactual propositions with                       
metaphysically impossible antecedents, so-called ‘counterpossibles’: 
 
“Even if God couldn’t command [a sacrificial scenario], doesn’t the [DCM*] still have the 
counterintuitive implication that if He​ did​ command [a sacrificial scenario], [a sacrificial 
scenario] would be morally obligatory?” (Morriston (2009), 250)  
 
“I think the revised proposal is unacceptable […] [because] implicit in the proposal is the 
notion that […] if,​ per impossible​, God were not loving, He could make it the case that it is 
obligatory for someone to inflict a gratuitous pummeling on another human being.” 
(Wielenberg (2005), 49)  
 
“[E]ven if God in fact never would or could command us to rape, the [DCM*] still 
implies the counterfactual that, if God did command us to rape, then we would have a 
moral obligation to rape. That is absurd.” (Sinnott-Armstrong (2009), 106) 
 
In other words, Morriston, Wielenberg and Sinnott-Armstrong are happy to give up premise (2)                           
but believe that we can easily reformulate the objection from horrible commands in a way that                               
does not require the truth of (2): The new argument is much simpler than before and relies on a                                     
simple application of modus tollens​. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong point out                     
that DCM* entails proposition (3) ‘If God were to command a sacrificial scenario, then a                             
sacrificial scenario would be morally obligatory’. Furthermore, even if the impossible were to                         
become actual and God were to command a sacrificial scenario, a sacrificial scenario would still                             
not be morally obligatory. For this reason, they claim that the proposition (3) bears the                             
truth-value ‘false’. Now, since DCM* entails (3) and (3) is false, we may infer that DCM* must                                 
be false as well. Therefore, Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong argue that even if we                           
endorse NECESSARY GOODNESS, the objection of horrible commands remains in full force. 
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Semantic preconditions of the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible 
commands 
 
At this point, I would like to elaborate on the semantic preconditions of Morriston’s,                           
Wielenberg’s, and Sinnott-Armstrong’s ‘improved’ counterpossible version of the objection of                   
horrible commands. We saw that their argument hinges on the assumption that the                         
counterfactual proposition (3) bears the truth-value ‘false’. This assumption is at odds with                         
‘vacuist’ semantics of counterfactuals. In general, vacuism holds that every counterfactual with                       
a metaphysically impossible antecedent proposition is true irrespectively of what consequent                     
proposition is attached to it. In other words, according to vacuism, ​all counterpossibles are true.                             
For instance, Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) have famously defended vacuism. Let me point                           
out how a vacuist semantics would undermine counterpossible version of the objection of                         
horrible commands. If we take for granted NECESSARY GOODNESS, then the antecedent of (3)                           
is metaphysically impossible. Thus, (3) is a counterpossible. For this reason, a vacuist semantics                           
of counterfactuals assigns the truth-value ‘true’ to (3). Furthermore, we saw that the                         8
counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands held that if (3) is false, then we                               
may infer by modus tollens that DCM* is false as well. Thus, if vacuist semantics is correct and (3)                                     
is true, we can no longer maintain this objection. Thus, it seems like we can defend DCM*                                 
against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands by endorsing vacuist                         
semantics. 
 
However, Morriston has anticipated this manoeuvre on behalf of DCM*. He argues that there                           
must be something fishy about vacuist semantics because it is easy to come up with                             
counterexamples of false counterpossibles. In a footnote, Morriston mentions the following                     
counterpossible that he takes to be false even if we assume that it is a “metaphysically necessary                                 
truth that God is good” (Morriston (2009), 266n):  
 
(6) “[I]f (​per impossibile​) God were evil, He would be good” (Morriston (2009), 266n). 
 
Morriston points out that since we have the intuition that at least (6) is false, no sensible                                 
semantic theory can hold that literally all counterpossibles are true. Therefore, it seems to be a                               
bad idea to defend DCM* by endorsing vacuist semantics.  9
 
8 Aquinas discusses the truth-value of a proposition that is very similar to (3). Incidentally, his position seems 
to be in align with vacuist semantics: Aquinas holds that if we understand Aristotle’s assumption “that God 
can deliberately do what is evil […] on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible – as, for instance, if 
we were to say that God can do evil things if He will” (ST 1a, q. 25, a. 3), then “there is no reason why a 
conditional proposition should not be true” (Ibid.). Admittedly, to think that there is ‘no reason why a 
conditional proposition should not be true’ is not exactly the same as to think that such a conditional 
proposition is genuinely true. 
9 Furthermore, please note that Morriston’s argument could be strengthened by a range of examples of 
(allegedly) false counterpossibles that have been put forward outside of philosophy of religion in order to put 
pressure on vacuist semantics (Nolan (1997), 544) (Brogaard / Salerno (2013), 642-3) (Kment (2014), 3) (Berto et 
al. (2018), 695). 
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Pruss’s ​reductio​ argument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible 
commands 
 
Before I turn to my own pragmatics-based attempt to defend DCM* against the counterpossible                           
version of the objection of horrible commands, I will discuss Pruss’s (2009) popular reductio                           
defence of DCM*. 
 
The underlying idea of Pruss’s defence of DCM* is the following: Pruss argues that the                             
counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands “proves too much – it equally                           
applies against every substantive metaethical theory” (Pruss (2009), 434). So, Pruss argues that                         
the intuition that drives Morriston’s, Wielenberg’s, and Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection against                   
DCM* commits them to believe that ​all substantive metaethical theories are false. Pruss believes                           
that this commitment is sufficient to render the underlying intuition of the counterpossible                         
version of the objection of horrible commands ​ad absurdum​.  
 
To understand Pruss’s argument in more detail, we need to get clear on what he means by a                                   
‘substantive metaethical theory’. If we generalise the structure of DCM, we get a good sense of                               
what Pruss takes to be a metaethical theory in general:  
 
A ​metaethical theory​ is a theory that posits that there is a characteristic property​ F​ that 
satisfies the following two conditions:  
a) It is metaphysically necessary that, for every act ​x​: ​x​ is morally obligatory if and only 
if ​x​ is ​F​.   
b) It is metaphysically necessary that, for every act ​x​: If ​x​ is morally obligatory, then ​x​ is 
morally obligatory because ​x​ is ​F​. 
 
Pruss claims that a metaethical theory needs to meet two further criteria in order to count as                                 
substantive​: On the one hand, a substantive metaethical theory cannot define the property F “by                             
giving an infinite list of all the obligatory and wrong actions” (Pruss (2009), 434). On the other                                 
hand, the property ​F should serve as a suitable non-circular definition of the property of being                               
morally obligatory (Pruss (2009), 434). Thus, the definition of ​F cannot involve the property of                             
being morally obligatory again. Pruss (2009, 437) explicitly mentions that if we believe that                           
Moore’s (1993) ‘open question argument’ can be applied to moral obligations , then we cannot                           10
provide a metaethical theory that satisfies the latter criterion. Moore’s argument is supposed to                           
show that there is only one correct way to define the property F​: namely, as the property of                                   
being morally obligatory. This, however, leads to an obviously circular definition of the                         
property of being morally obligatory. According to Moore’s argument, every other attempt to                         
define F would leave an ‘open question’ whether ​F really is a suitable definition of the property                                 
of being morally obligatory. For this reason, Moore dismisses all non-circular metaethical                       
theories and, thus, all metaethical theories that are substantive in Pruss’s sense. 
 
10 Technically, Moore’s argument is supposed to apply to moral ​goodness​ instead of moral ​obligations​.  
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Obviously, DCM* and DCM are examples of substantive metaethical theories. In the case of                           
DCM* and DCM, F is the property of being commanded by God. Furthermore, Pruss mentions                             
‘Kantianism’ as another example for a substantive metaethical theory. In the latter case, F is the                               
property of being “consistently required by both categorical imperatives” (Pruss (2009), 435).  
 
Let me turn to the core of Pruss’s argument: Pruss argues that we can construct an objection                                 
against ​every substantive metaethical theory that has the very same structure as the                         
counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands of Morriston, Wielenberg, and                       
Sinnott-Armstrong. Again, the argument presupposes that there is an act that is ​not morally                           
obligatory as a matter of metaphysical necessity. Again, I will assume that the example of a                               
sacrificial scenario fits this bill. Now, let ​T be a substantive metaethical theory as defined above.                               
To ensure that ​T is subject to the same modal intuitions as DCM*, we need to make the further                                     
assumption that it is metaphysically impossible for a sacrificial scenario to be ​F – this                             
assumption plays the same role as NECESSARY GOODNESS in the counterpossible version of                         
the objection of horrible commands. This assumption is innocent in the case of most substantive                             
metaethical theories. For instance, it appears uncontroversial that it is metaphysically                     11
impossible for a sacrificial scenario to be required by all versions of Kant’s categorical                           
imperative. Henceforth, let ​T* be the conjunction of ​T and the assumption that it is                             
metaphysically impossible for a sacrificial scenario to be ​F​. I hope that it is easy to see that                                   
DCM* is an instance of ​T*​. 
 
Pruss’s argument starts by assuming the truth of ​T* for ​reductio​. Remember that, according to                             
part (a) of the definition of a metaethical theory, it is metaphysically necessary that every act                               
that is morally obligatory also is ​F and ​vice versa​. Therefore, ​T* entails the following                             
counterfactual proposition:  
 
(7) If a sacrificial scenario were to be ​F​, then a sacrificial scenario would be morally 
obligatory (from (a) of ​T*​). 
 
11 At this point, Pruss points out that we have to deal with a complication: consequentialist metaethical theories 
do not seem to be committed to the assumption that it is metaphysically impossible for a sacrificial scenario to 
be ​F​ (in this case, to bring about the best consequences). Rather, a consequentialist will presumably hold that it 
is metaphysically possible for a sacrificial scenario to have the best consequences – for example, in a situation 
in which refraining from committing a sacrificial scenario would lead to consequences that are ​even worse​ than 
those of a sacrificial scenario. Therefore, it seems that Pruss’s ​reductio​ argument does not threaten to refute 
literally all substantive metaethical theories – but only the non-consequentialist ones. In response, Pruss (2009, 
435-6) points out that consequentialist metaethical theories suffer from a different defect: they do not merely 
claim that it is metaphysically possible for a sacrificial scenario to have the best consequences but also that it is, 
for this reason, metaphysically possible for a sacrificial scenario to be morally obligatory. For this reason, they 
need to reject premise (1) which claimed that it is metaphysically necessary that a sacrificial scenario is not 
morally obligatory. However, rejecting (1) comes with significant costs that I highlighted in my criticism of 
Ockhamism already. Pruss makes this point by remarking that “[e]ven if it were to have the best consequences, 
torture of the innocent would still be wrong” (Pruss (2009), 435). At any rate, even if one has doubts about 
Pruss’s criticism of consequentialism, I would like to point out that the objection of horrible commands 
requires premise (1) to get off the ground. If one rejects this premise, then it is an easy task to refute the 
objection of horrible commands anyway. 
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(7) is the equivalent to (3) in the counterpossible version of horrible commands. Now, because                             
T* comprises of the assumption that it is metaphysically impossible for a sacrificial scenario to                             
be ​F​, (7) is a counterpossible just like (3). Arguably, the same intuition that makes Morriston,                               
Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong believe that (3) is a false counterpossible commits them to                         
believe that (7) is a false counterpossible as well. They may be expected to hold that even if the                                     
impossible were to become actual and a sacrificial scenario were to become ​F​, then a sacrificial                               
scenario would still ​not be morally obligatory. This is exactly what they argued for in the case of                                   
DCM*. Now, since ​T* entails (7) and (7) is false, we may infer by ​modus tollens that ​T* must be                                       
false as well. 
 
The structure of this argument mirrors exactly that of the counterpossible version of the                           
objection of horrible commands. Therefore, Pruss claims to have shown that the underlying                         
modal intuition of the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands render all                           
substantive metaethical theories equally untenable. Pruss claims that this is a devastating                       
consequence. For this reason, Pruss concludes that ​something about the counterpossible version                       
of the objection of horrible commands must be fishy. 
 
Problems 
 
I believe that Pruss’s ​reductio​ argument suffers from two weaknesses:  
 
First, Pruss’s aim was to point out that there is a certain asymmetry with respect to our                                 
treatment of objections that have a similar structure as the counterpossible version of the                           
objection from horrible commands. Apparently, these objections seem to refute DCM* but they                         
fail to harm other substantive metaethical theories. This is inconsistent, according to Pruss. In                           
order to restore consistency, Pruss recommends to withdraw one’s support for all objections                         
that have the same structure as the counterpossible version of the objection from horrible                           
commands. I agree that this is a way to restore consistency but I have doubts whether we are                                   
forced to draw this conclusion. Rather, a proponent of the counterpossible version of the                           
objection of horrible commands might equally well withdraw support for the very project of                           
substantive metaethics. This manoeuvre would restore consistency equally well. Pruss explicitly                     
admits that this is a loophole in his argument when he concedes that “there is always the                                 
possibility that someone will embrace this line of reasoning as an argument against the very                             
possibility of a substantive meta-ethics, along the lines of Moore’s open question argument.”                         
(Pruss (2009), 437) 
 
This criticism can be strengthened by pointing out that the very idea of a substantive                             
metaethical theory is more controversial than it might seem at first sight. Keep in mind that,                               
according to Pruss, a metaethical theory can only count as ​substantive if its characteristic                           
property F serves as a non-circular definition of the property of being morally obligatory.                           12
12 Unfortunately, Pruss does not tell us why he does not believe that his argument applies to metaethical 
theories that define the property of being morally obligatory in a circular way. Presumably, the intuition that 
the respective version of (7) is false can only arise if the conceptual link between the property of being morally 
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However, for instance, proponents of the increasingly popular position of non-theistic                     
non-naturalist moral realism doubt that such a property exists (e.g. Moore (1993),                       
Shafer-Landau (2003), Wielenberg (2009), Enoch (2011), Parfit (2011), Cuneo / Shafer-Landau                     
(2014)). They argue that there is no property that serves as a non-circular definition of the                               
property of being morally obligatory and that is not ultimately defined in terms of the property                               
of being morally obligatory already. In this vein, for instance, Wielenberg (who incidentally is                           
one of Pruss’s main dialectical opponents) claims that “[e]thical properties [e.g. the property of                           
being morally obligatory] are ​sui generis properties that are not reducible to other kinds of                             
properties” (Wielenberg (2009), 25). Of course, it is an option for non-theistic non-naturalist                         
moral realists to endorse a metaethical theory as long as it is not substantive – thus, they merely                                   
are committed to assume that its characteristic property F can only be defined in terms that                               
involve the property of being morally obligatory. For this reason, a proponent of the                           
counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands can evade Pruss’s ​reductio                       
argument by endorsing non-theistic non-naturalist moral realism. Thus, Pruss’s defence of                     
DCM* is dialectically inefficient against a major strand of contemporary metaethics. This is a                           
significant loophole of Pruss’s ​reductio​ argument. 
 
Second, Pruss himself admits that his argument is “unsatisfactory since it does not show ​what is                               
fishy about [arguments that have the same structure as the counterpossible version of the                           
objection of horrible commands]” (Pruss (2009), 437). Maybe, this weakness can be overcome.                         
Pruss discusses three attempts to locate the underlying mistake: 
 
a) First, Pruss observes that “when we are very strongly sure that something is true and its                               
truth is very important to us [e.g. that a sacrificial scenario is ​not morally obligatory], we                               
have a tendency to carry it over into counterfactual situations” (Pruss (2009), 438). We                           
might simply reject this assumption as unwarranted and claim that it is metaphysically                         
possible for a sacrificial scenario to be morally obligatory. In other words, we might                           
follow the lead of Ockham and jettison the belief that certain acts are opposed to moral                               
obligation as a matter of metaphysical necessity. However, this proposal would boil                       
down to rejecting premise (1) again. We have already pointed out that this strategy is of                               
no avail because it runs into conflict with the (especially among Jewish and Christian                           
believers) widespread assumption that “(basic) moral and other normative norms […]                     
are norms with maximal, and even modally maximal, jurisdiction” (Enoch (2011), 145). 
 
b) Second, Pruss argues that we could simply endorse vacuist semantics. We saw that                         
Pruss’s argument relies on the semantic assumption that certain counterpossibles are                     
false (in particular, (7) in general and (3) in the special case of DCT*). Therefore, if we                                 
endorse vacuist semantics, (7) and (3) would turn out to be true and the worrisome                             
consequences depicted by Pruss would no longer arise. However, when we try to                         
obligatory and the property ​F​ is not too tight. For instance, even hardly any opponent of vacuist semantics 
would consider the counterpossible ‘If a sacrificial scenario were morally obligatory, then a sacrificial scenario 
would be morally obligatory’ to be false. For instance, the non-vacuist semantics of Berto et al. (2018, 699) 
renders counterpossible of this kind trivially true. 
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discuss the prospects of vacuist semantics, we enter a controversial and increasingly                       
complex debate. Morriston’s counterexample (6) is only one problem that a defence of                         
vacuist semantics would have to deal with. There are numerous other arguments that                         
need to be taken into account. For this reason, a lot more work would need to be done                                   13
in order to successfully point out that the underlying mistake of the counterpossible                         
version of horrible commands is its tacit commitment to non-vacuist semantics. 
 
c) Third, Pruss considers a suggestion by C. S. Evans. Evans claims that we tend to assume                               
that the falsity of the counterpossible (3) threatens to refute DCM* because of “our                           
ignorance of the nature of God” (Pruss (2009), 438). In this vein, Evans claims that “[i]f                               
we really knew God’s perfectly good nature, we would not take [(3)] seriously.” (Pruss                           
2009, 438) This line of argument can be generalised to all substantive metaethical                         
theories: one might argue that once we properly understood a substantive metaethical                       
theory ​T*​, we would not take the falsity of (7) to be a worrisome consequence that                               
threatens to refute T*​. However, I fail to see how the problems for T* would vanish once                                 
(7) turned out to be less worthy of attention. To ignore a problem (unfortunately) does                             
not make it less of a problem. Surely, an educated proponent of T* might not be                               
preoccupied with metaphysically impossible scenarios in which a sacrificial scenario                   
somehow ends up being F​. However, once far-fetched scenarios of this kind are brought                           
up, it becomes apparent that the beliefs of the proponent of T* are inconsistent (at least,                               
if we suppose that the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands as                           
well as Pruss’s argument are correct). For this reason, I doubt that Evans’s suggestion                           
manages to show what exactly has gone awry with the counterpossible version of the                           
objection of horrible commands. 
 
Let us take stock. We saw that Pruss’s ​reductio argument suffers from two weaknesses. On the                               
one hand, Pruss’s argument only manages to impress those who endorse the very idea of                             
substantive metaethics in the first place. Of course, this does not mean that Pruss’s argument is                               
useless. Pruss’s argument indeed forces those who buy into the project of substantive                         
metaethics to withdraw support for the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible                         
commands. On the other hand, Pruss admits that his argument is “unsatisfactory” (Pruss 2009,                           
437) because it fails to explain what exactly has gone wrong with the counterpossible version of                               
the objection of horrible commands. Maybe, this weakness can be eliminated, say, by providing                           
a full-blown defence of vacuist semantics. However, a lot more work would be required to                             
show that this can be done. Again, this aspect of Pruss’s argument does not make it less forceful                                   
because one does not need to show why a theory fails in order to show ​that it fails. However, I                                       
believe that it is a legitimate desire to try to answer the question ​why the counterpossible                               
version of the objection of horrible commands fails. If this question turns out to be impossible to                                 
answer, then the suspicion arises that Pruss’s argument ultimately relies on nothing but a                           
13 Nolan (1997), Brogaard and Salerno (2013), Berto et al. (2018), and Lampert (2019) argue against vacuist 
semantics while Lewis (1973, 24-26), Wierenga (1998), Vetter (2016), Emery and Hill (2017), and Williamson 
(2007, 134-178, 2018) defend it. 
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logical trick. Thus, I believe that it would be preferable to defend DCM* in a way that does not                                     
suffer from this weakness. 
 
A new defence of divine command metaethics: pragmatic debunking 
 
In this section, I will depict a new way to defend DCM* against the counterpossible version of                                 
the objection of horrible commands. 
 
We saw that Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong try to explain our intuition that the                           
counterpossible (3) is false in a ​semantic way – by claiming that (3) must in fact bear the                                   
truth-value ’false’. In contrast, I believe that we should provide a ​pragmatic explanation for this                             
intuition while leaving intact the ​semantic assumption that (3) bears the truth-value ‘true’. More                           
precisely, I believe that the intuition that (3) is false arises as a result of a ​conversational                                 
implicature​. If this strategy is successful, then we can no longer infer the falsity of DCM* from                                 
the falsity of (3) and the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands loses its                               
edge.  14
 
I would like to highlight that this proposal is different from simply endorsing vacuist semantics:                             
To defeat the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands, we do not need to                               
endorse the vacuist claim that literally ​all counterpossibles are true. Rather, my proposal merely                           
aims to argue for the much more modest claim that (3) is true.  
 
At first, I would like to clarify a couple of concepts that are involved in my argument.                                 
Famously, Grice has pointed out that we usually assume that conversational participants obey                         
the so-called ‘Cooperative Principle’: 
 
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it                           
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are                             
engaged.” (Grice (1989), 26) 
 
In particular, Grice observes that sensible conversations are governed by the so-called ‘maxim                         
of quantity’ which advises us to be “as informative as is required (for the current purposes of                                 
the exchange)” (Grice (1989), 26). Let me briefly illustrate this maxim of Grice’s ‘Cooperative                           
Principle’. For example, take Esther’s assertion ‘If I perish, I perish’ (Esther 4:16). If we assume                               
that Esther’s assertion has to be interpreted literally, then it expresses nothing but a mere                             
tautology. Therefore, on such an interpretation, Esther’s assertion fails to convey ​any                       
information. Therefore, Esther’s assertion would violate the maxim of quantity of Grice’s                       
‘Cooperative Principle’.  
 
14 This strategy is indebted to Emery’s and Hill’s (2017) review of Kment (2014). They have proposed a similar 
strategy to debunk truth-value intuitions about counterexamples that (allegedly) threaten to refute vacuist 
semantics in general. 
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Nevertheless, Esther’s assertion seems perfectly reasonable to us. The reason is that the meaning                           
of Esther’s assertion is affected by a so-called ‘conversational implicature’. In general, we say                           
that a speaker has ‘conversationally implicated’ a proposition p by an utterance ​U if and only if                                 
the application of Grice’s ‘Cooperative Principle’ allows a sensible hearer to infer ​p from ​U                             
(Birner (2013), 43-44). For instance, Esther may assume that a sensible hearer would not believe                             
that she was trying to convey an uninformative tautology. Rather, Esther may assume that a                             
sensible hearer would be able to make use of Grice’s ‘Cooperative Principle’ to infer that she                               
meant to express something more informative like ‘I am willing to risk my life’. In other words,                                 
we may say that Esther ​conversationally implicated​ that she is willing to risk her life.   
 
Now, I believe that we have all the conceptual ingredients to understand my pragmatics-based                           
explanation for our inclination to take (3) to be false. At this point, it is important to keep in                                     
mind what (3) said:  
 
(3) If God were to command a sacrificial scenario, then a sacrificial scenario would be 
morally obligatory. 
 
I believe that (3), on a literal reading, provides more information than we find appropriate in                               
this context. Suppose we are in a context in which NECESSARY GOODNESS is part of the                               
common ground. For our purposes, only these contexts matter because we are discussing                         15
DCM against the backdrop of NECESSARY GOODNESS. Now, in these contexts, it is known                           
that it is metaphysically impossible for God to command a sacrificial scenario. Now, suppose                           
we interpret (3) in a literal way and, thus, bracket the effects of potential conversational                             
implicatures for a moment. Then, I believe that it is very hard to see on which grounds a                                   
reasonable speaker might ever be entitled to assert a counterpossible like (3). Since the                           
antecedent of (3) is known to be metaphysically impossible, it does not seem to make any                               
difference what exactly the consequent of (3) is. A literal interpretation of (3) seems to convey                               
more information than we find appropriate in such a context. For this reason, I believe that                               
asserting (3) in this context would violate the maxim of quantity of Grice’s ‘Cooperative                           
Principle’. Incidentally, already Aristotle seems to express a similar thought when he writes                         16
that “no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise” (Aristotle (2004), 1139a). 
 
Therefore, in the aforementioned context, a sensible hearer who takes for granted Grice’s                         
‘Cooperative Principle’ may be expected to assume that the utterer of (3) meant to convey a                               
proposition that is more informative than a literal interpretation of (3). I believe that we obtain                               
the most plausible candidate for a more informative interpretation of (3) if we take for granted a                                 
less sophisticated understanding of God. Henceforth, I will use the term ‘God​–​’ to refer to a                               
being that is just like God with the only difference that it is metaphysically possible for it to                                   
15 On the concept of ‘common ground’, see Stalnaker (2002). 
16 Also, Lewis argues for a similar claim when he conjectures that​ all​ counterpossibles might be propositions 
that “for conversational reasons […] [are] pointless to assert” (Lewis (1973), 25). If it turned out that von Fintel 
(2001), Gillies (2007), Starr (2014), and Willer (2015) are right to claim that counterpossibles suffer from a 
presupposition failure, then we would have a neat explanation for this fact. 
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exhibit moral shortcomings. For this reason, NECESSARY GOODNESS only applies to God, but                         
not to God​–​. Now, I believe that a sensible hearer of (3) who takes for granted Grice’s                                 
‘Cooperative Principle’ will assume that a speaker of (3) meant to conversationally implicate the                           
following proposition (3)​–​: 
 
(3)​–​ If God​–​ were to command a sacrificial scenario, then a sacrificial scenario would be 
morally obligatory. 
 
Let me briefly explain why (3)​– actually bears the truth-value ‘false’. We know that God​– (in                               
contrast to God) is not perfectly morally good as a matter of metaphysical necessity. For this                               
reason, (3)​– is an ordinary counterfactual with a metaphysically possible antecedent and we may                           
use conventional semantic methods to assign a truth-value to (3)​– (e.g. Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s                           
orthodox semantics of counterfactuals). Keep in mind that the very starting point for our                           
discussion was the intuition that a sacrificial scenario can under no circumstances be morally                           
obligatory. Therefore, we may conclude that even if God​– were to command a sacrificial                           
scenario, it would still​ not​ be morally obligatory. Therefore, (3)​–​ is false.  
 
The crucial step in my argument is the claim that our truth-value intuitions about (3) stem from                                 
our inclination to confuse it with (3)​–​. In other words, I believe that we may assume that a                                   
speaker of (3) meant to conversationally implicate (3)​– because asserting (3) would violate                         
Grice’s ‘Cooperative Principle’ and (3)​– is very similar to (3) but yet actually conveys an                             
appropriate amount of information. In other words, I believe that we tend to lapse back to a less                                   
sophisticated understanding of God if this is a way to make sense of a particular assertion about                                 
God. I believe that it is plausible to assume that a speaker of (3) meant to conversationally                                 
implicate (3)​– because we obtain (3)​– if we take (3) and bracket the information that is                               
responsible for the fact that (3) violates Grice’s ‘Cooperative Principle’, viz. the information that                           
is is metaphysically impossible for God to command a sacrificial scenario. 
 
So, we have seen that (3)​– bears the truth-value ‘false’ and that we tend to confuse (3) with (3)​–                                     
for pragmatic reasons. This explains why we tend to believe that (3) bears the truth-value ‘false’.                               
However, since (3) and (3)​– are entirely different propositions, there is no need to assume that                               
the counterpossible (3) actually bears the truth-value ‘false’. Rather, my pragmatic explanation                       
is perfectly compatible with the semantic assumption that (3) is ​true​. I conclude that drawing                             
attention to our intuition to take (3) to be false does not threaten to refute DCM* because it is not                                       
clear ​how this intuition is to be explained best. The problems for DCM* vanish if we explain this                                   
intuition in a pragmatic way. For this reason, I conclude that being committed to the                             
counterpossible (3) does not suffice to refute DCM*. Thus, Morriston’s, Wielenberg’s, and                       
Sinnott-Armstrong’s counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands did not turn                       
out to be successful. For this reason, both the simple and the counterpossible version of the                               
objection of horrible commands against DCM* turn out to be unsuccessful. 
 
I believe that my pragmatics-based defence of DCM* does not suffer from the two weaknesses                             
of Pruss’s defence. First, we saw that Pruss’s defence has the dialectical disadvantage that it                             
15 
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only manages to impress those who endorse the very idea of substantive metaethics in the first                               
place. In contrast, my defence of DCM* is entirely independent of what one thinks of the very                                 
project of substantive metaethics. Second, we saw that Pruss fails to explain exactly what has                             
gone wrong with the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands. In contrast,                           
my defence of DCM* offers a clear explanation in terms of pragmatics. Furthermore, a third                             
advantage of my pragmatics-based defence of DCM* is that it enables us to explain why Pruss’s                               
defence of DCM* works: namely, it explains the fundamental asymmetry with respect to our                           
tendency to treat objections that have the same structure as the counterpossible version of the                             
objection from horrible commands. Let me elaborate. We saw that Pruss’s argument is based on                             
the assumption that we are reluctant to be convinced by the analogue of the counterpossible                             
version of the objection of horrible commands in case of non-DCM* substantive metaethical                         
theories. Presumably, the reason is that DCM* is special insofar as its version of (7) employs a                                 
notoriously controversial concept (‘God’) that has a different modal profile depending on one’s                         
preferred account of it. In contrast, the version of (7) that is endorsed by other substantive                               
metaethical theories (e.g. Kantianism) does not contain any concepts that are equally contested.                         
Thus, in the case of non-DCM* substantive metaethical theories, we are not at risk of lapsing                               
back to a less sophisticated understanding of the concepts involved in (7) in order to come up                                 
with a reasonable explanation of why someone might want to assert this proposition.                         
Presumably, this is why in these cases we do not tend to assume that the speaker of (7) meant to                                       
assert a proposition that differs from (7) by means of a conversational implicature. Therefore, in                             
the case of non-DCM* substantive metaethical theories, the intuition that (7) cannot be asserted                           
anyway is more likely to arise and, thus, we tend to believe that it is of no importance what                                     
truth-value we assign to it. This might explain why we are reluctant to believe that (7) must be                                   
false in the case of non-DCM* substantive metaethical theories. However, as we have seen, this                             
intuition is required in order to get the analogue of the counterpossible version of the objection                               
of horrible commands off the ground.  17
 
Please note that even if my defence of DCM* is correct, this does not mean that DCM* is correct.                                     
The objection of horrible commands is merely ​one objection that DCM* has to face. So, even if                                 
this objection turns out to be harmless, some other objection might pose a more serious                             
challenge for DCM*. 
 
Objections 
 
Of course, one may argue that the God of (3) is fundamentally different from the God​– of (3)​–​.                                   
Therefore, it might seem implausible to try to explain our truth-value intuitions about (3) by our                               
inclination to confuse it with (3)​–​.  18
 
17 Presumably, Pruss comes close to realising this when he writes “that it is easier to imagine the 
antecedent of [the DCM*-version of (7)] being true than it is to imagine the categorical imperatives 
consistently requiring torture of the innocent [which is the antecedent of the Kantianism-version of (7)]” 
(Pruss (2009), 439). 
18 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue. 
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In response, I would like to make two points: 
 
First, I would like to highlight that I do ​not recommend to interpret (3) as (3)​–​. I believe that                                     
replacing God for God​– is an erroneous (yet tempting) way to interpret (3). DCM* is formulated                               
in terms of God and not God​–​. However, by definition, God (who is subject to NECESSARY                               
GOODNESS) is not the same as God​– (who is not subject to NECESSARY GOODNESS). Thus,                             
one can neither replace God by God​– in the definition of DCM* nor in any proposition that                                 
follows from DCM* – in particular, not in (3). For this reason, we are well advised not to confuse                                     
(3) with (3)​–​.  
 
Second, I believe that it is nevertheless tempting to confuse the God of (3) with the God​– of (3)​–                                     
when we are supposed to make sense of (3). I would like to offer two additional arguments to                                   
back up this claim. 
 
First, I think that it might be helpful to think about the meaning of the term ‘God’ for a moment.                                       
For instance, Oppy (2014, 1-29) has put forward an account of the term that relies on the                                 
distinction between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions’ of God. On the one hand, Oppy suggests that                           
the ’concept’ of God is a minimal definition of the term ‘God’ that everyone has to accept in                                   
order to count as a competent user of this term. Oppy claims that the concept of God is best                                     
formulated in the following way: 
 
“[T]o be God is just to be the one and only […] superhuman being or entity who has and                                     
exercises power over the natural world” (Oppy (2014), 1). 
 
If Oppy’s proposal is correct, then one cannot be considered as a competent user of the term                                 
‘God’ if, say, one claims that God has no power over the natural world. In contrast, a                                 
‘conception’ of God is an elaborate proposal about how God is best understood. Typically, we                             
arrive at a conception of God as the result of a lengthy investigation of the divine nature. For                                   
example, Oppy mentions Swinburne’s proposal to understand God as “a person without a body                           
– i.e. a spirit – who is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and the                               
creator of all things” (Swinburne (2004), 8). If Oppy’s proposal is correct, then one still counts as                                 
a competent user of the term ‘God’ if, say, contra Swinburne, one claims that God has a body.                                   
Now, the details of Oppy’s proposal might be controversial but that is not important for the                               
purposes of this essay. It seems that Oppy is right to claim that NECESSARY GOODNESS is not                                 
part of the ​concept of God. Thus, we may deny that God is perfectly morally good as a matter of                                       
metaphysical necessity and still count as competent users of the term ‘God’. Nevertheless,                         
NECESSARY GOODNESS is part of some conceptions of God. Presumably, many theologians                       
will agree that we can only get to know NECESSARY GOODNESS by means of ‘empirical’                             
investigation (e.g. by consulting or interpreting scripture or tradition). For this reason, a hearer                           
still counts as a competent user of the term ‘God’ if he or she confuses the God of (3) (who is                                         
subject to NECESSARY GOODNESS) with the God​– of (3)​– (who is not subject to NECESSARY                             
GOODNESS). Therefore, I do not believe that the God of (3) is so fundamentally different from                               
the God​–​ of (3)​–​ that a confusion of both is unlikely to occur, as the objection claimed. 
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Second, Mugg (2016) assembles psychological evidence that strengthens the assumption that we                       
tend to treat (3) as (3)​–​. Mugg points out that contemporary research relating to the                             
phenomenon of ‘cognitive decoupling’ (e.g. Leslie (1987), Nichols / Stich (2003), 16-59) suggests                         
the following picture: when we are asked to assign a truth-value to a counterpossible without a                               
glaring contradiction in the antecedent, we tend to confine ourselves with assessing “the closest                           
(partial) state of affairs” (Mugg (2016), 450) in which the antecedent is true. Mugg argues that                               
we obtain these ‘closest (partial) state of affairs’ by pretending that the antecedent is true while                               
“screen[ing] out those beliefs that (with the antecedent of the counterfactual) imply                       
contradictions” (Mugg (2016), 449). Thus, this supports the assumption that we tend to ‘screen                           
out’ the belief that NECESSARY GOODNESS holds when we are asked to assign a truth-value                             
to (3) because NECESSARY GOODNESS gives rise to a contradiction in conjunction with the                           
antecedent of (3). Now, if we suspend our belief that NECESSARY GOODNESS holds, (3) turns                             
into (3)​–​. Therefore, if Mugg’s assessment of the psychological evidence is correct, we have an                             
empirically-informed reason to believe that we tend to treat (3) like (3)​–​. Thus, I do not believe                                 19
that one can simply undermine my pragmatics-based defence of DCM* by claiming that (3)​– is                             
so fundamentally different from (3) that it is implausible to assume that we tend to confuse                               
them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let me summarise. Initially, it appeared as if DCM can be defended against the objection of                               
horrible commands merely by invoking NECESSARY GOODNESS (and, thus, turning DCM                     
into DCM*). However, critics of DCM* such as Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong                       
have reformulated an improved version of the objection in terms of counterpossibles. In                         
particular, they took issue with the fact that DCM* is still committed to the counterpossible (3)                               
‘If God were to command a sacrificial scenario, then a sacrificial scenario would be morally                             
obligatory’ that they took to be false. Pruss tried to render this counterpossible version of the                               
objection of horrible commands to absurdity by showing that the underlying truth-value                       
intuitions are incompatible with any substantive metaethical theory. In response, I pointed out                         
that Pruss’s argument suffers from two weaknesses: On the one hand, Pruss’s ​reductio argument                           
is no threat if one is opposed to the very idea of substantive metaethics. On the other hand,                                   
Pruss himself admits that his defence is unsatisfactory because it does not manage to locate the                               
underlying mistake of the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands. I                         
argued that this is no reason to worry for the proponent of divine command metaethics because                               
a more promising way to defend DCM* is available: I argued that we can explain our intuition                                 
to take (3) to be false in a ​pragmatic way that is perfectly compatible with the ​semantic                                 
assumption that (3) is true. In particular, I pointed out that a competent speaker of (3)                               
conversationally implicates the proposition (3)​– that differs from (3) insofar as it incorporates a                           
19 Mugg (2016) suggests that we should endorse a non-vacuist semantics of counterfactuals in order to account 
for these truth-value intuitions. I would like to highlight that I am sceptical whether this is the right conclusion 
to draw. Mugg seems to be unaware of how our truth-value intuitions about counterpossibles are distorted by 
conversational implicatures. 
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less sophisticated understanding of God. Thus, our truth-value intuitions about (3) merely                       
reflect the truth-value of (3)​– but not of (3). For this reason, Morriston, Wielenberg, and                             
Sinnott-Armstrong did not manage to show that (3) is false. This pragmatic debunking                         
manoeuvre allowed me to reject their claim that DCM* is committed to a false counterpossible.                             
Therefore, even the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands against                       
DCM* turned out to be unsuccessful.  20
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